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Abstract
Optical network security is attracting increasing research interest. Currently, 
software-defined optical network (SDON) has been proposed to increase network 
intelligence (e.g., flexibility and programmability) which is gradually moving toward 
industrialization. However, a variety of new threats are emerging in SDONs. Data 
encryption is an effective way to secure communications in SDONs. However, classi-
cal key distribution methods based on the mathematical complexity will suffer from 
increasing computational power and attack algorithms in the near future. Noticeably, 
quantum key distribution (QKD) is now being considered as a secure mechanism to 
provision information-theoretically secure secret keys for data encryption, which is a 
potential technique to protect communications from security attacks in SDONs. This 
chapter introduces the basic principles and enabling technologies of QKD. Based on 
the QKD enabling technologies, an architecture of QKD over SDONs is presented. 
Resource allocation problem is elaborated in detail and is classified into wavelength 
allocation, time-slot allocation, and secret key allocation problems in QKD over 
SDONs. Some open issues and challenges such as survivability, cost optimization, and 
key on demand (KoD) for QKD over SDONs are discussed.
Keywords: optical network, SDON, security, QKD, architecture, resource allocation
1. Introduction
As more than two billion kilometers of optical fibers deployed worldwide [1], 
optical networks have currently served as one of the most important underlying 
infrastructures. Large confidential data transferred daily over the Internet relies 
on the secrecy and reliability of data channels (DChs) in optical networks against 
several types of cyberattacks, e.g., physically tapping or listening to the residual 
crosstalk from an adjacent channel [2, 3]. With the evolution of network intel-
ligence, software-defined networking (SDN) [4] is emerging and developing 
toward practical application, which is a promising technique to add flexibility and 
programmability in the optical layer. Hence, software-defined optical networking 
(SDON) is potential to become the next generation optical network architecture 
[5]. However, the control and configuration signaling messages transferred via the 
control channels (CChs) are also facing a variety of security attacks, e.g., anomaly 
attacks and intrusion attacks [6]. Therefore, two essential channels (i.e., DChs 
transferring sensitive data/services and CChs interchanging control/configuration 
messages) are vulnerable to cyberattacks in SDONs.
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Data encryption is an effective way to enhance the security of SDONs. However, 
classical key distribution methods are based on the mathematical and computa-
tional complexities, which will suffer from increased computational power and 
developed quantum computing in the near future [7]. Quantum key distribution 
(QKD) is a promising technique to secure key exchange and protect communica-
tions from security attacks in SDONs [8]. It can achieve information-theoretic 
security based on the fundamentals of quantum physics, such as the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle and quantum no-cloning theorem [9, 10]. Moreover, these 
fundamentals guarantee that the senders or receivers can detect the presence of 
any third party who is trying to obtain the secret keys. Optical fibers can be used 
in QKD systems to achieve good transmission performance of quantum signals. 
Nevertheless, the dark fibers utilized for QKD systems are inconvenient and 
expensive, while a potential solution is to use wavelength division multiplexing 
(WDM) technique for QKD integration in existing optical networks [11]. A lot of 
experiments and field trials have demonstrated the feasibility and practicability of 
integrating QKD into optical networks [12–18]. Therefore, based on above works, 
the objective of this chapter is to find how to deploy and employ QKD to enhance 
the security of SDONs.
2. Basic principles and enabling technologies of QKD
2.1 Principle of point-to-point QKD
The basic principle of point-to-point QKD is introduced based on the first 
invented QKD protocol, i.e., BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 
1984 [19], as illustrated in Figure 1. Nowadays, BB84 protocol is widely used in 
practical QKD systems [20, 21]. The BB84 protocol based QKD process is summa-
rized in the following three stages.
Figure 1. 
Principle of point-to-point QKD based on BB84 protocol.
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1. Qubit exchange: QKD transmitter (called Alice) generates qubits and sends 
them to the QKD receiver (called Bob) via a quantum channel (QCh). The 
qubits are generated by encoding a string of classical bits into single-polar-
ization photons with different states. For instance, the horizontal, vertical, 
and diagonal ±45° polarization states randomly selected from two conjugate 
bases (i.e., rectilinear+ and diagonal×) are encoded with 0+, 1+, 1×, and 0×, 
respectively. In order to achieve accurate qubit synchronization, a clock 
channel is also required here. Bob receives the incoming qubits and measures 
each single-polarization photon with one of the two conjugate bases (i.e., 
rectilinear+ and diagonal×), and it will record the measurement results and 
the selected bases.
2. Key sifting: Alice and Bob exchange their selected bases via a pubic channel 
(PCh), and then discard the qubits sent and measured with different conjugate 
bases. The remaining qubits will be decoded into a string of classical bits as 
sifted keys.
3. Key distillation: For error estimation and correction, a random substring of 
classical bits in sifted keys is exchanged and compared between Alice and 
Bob via the PCh. Finally, privacy amplification and authentication are imple-
mented to decide the remaining secure bits as secret keys.
Additionally, to improve the secret key rate in QKD systems in practice, decoy-
state can be integrated with BB84 protocol to basically reach the single-photon 
sources performance and estimate the number of single-polarization photons 
detected by Bob more precisely [8].
2.2 Trusted repeaters for distance extension
The secret key rate and distance of QKD are limited due to the attenuation of 
weak quantum signals in QChs. This limitation can be overcome by using quantum 
repeaters, but they are beyond any practical technologies today [22]. A compro-
mise and a practical solution to this challenge are using trusted repeaters, and this 
technique has been applied in the deployment of most QKD networks up to date 
[23–25]. In a QKD network based on trusted repeaters, the secret keys generated 
on the first QKD link can be relayed to the destination node by encrypting them 
with the secret keys generated in the intermediate nodes. One-time pad algorithm 
is applied for encryption to ensure the information-theoretic security of secret keys 
verified by Shannon [26], while the size of secret keys generated and encrypted 
here should be the same. Hence, secret keys are known by all intermediate nodes, 
making the secret key secure only as long as all the repeaters are trusted.
An example of QKD distance extension based on a trusted repeater between 
the source and destination nodes is illustrated in Figure 2. The QKD transmitter in 
the source node establishes a QKD link with the forthcoming QKD receiver in the 
intermediate node, whereas the QKD receiver in the destination node establishes a 
QKD link with the previous QKD transmitter in the intermediate node. Both QKD 
links produce, independently, secret keys Sk1 and Sk2 with the same key size. Then, 
the secret key Sk1 is encrypted with the secret key Sk2 and relayed to the destina-
tion node. Specifically, secret key Sk1 can be used later to secure communications 
between the source and destination nodes. This relay process can continue with 
any amount of intermediate nodes, but each intermediate node with the trusted 
repeater will know the secret key information.
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2.3 Quantum key pool (QKP) for secret key provisioning
Currently, the secret key rate in most QKD systems can only reach 1–2 Mbit/s 
over a 50 km fiber link [27]. Therefore, the efficient management of precious secret 
key resources is important. Recently, quantum key pool (QKP) technique is pro-
posed in QKD networks to timely provision secret keys for satisfying the security 
demands of communications crossing the networks [6], which is beneficial to 
enhance secret key management when the QKD develops from point-to-point links 
to networks. The secret keys generated between the two end nodes can be stored 
in the key store (KS) which is embedded in each of the two end-nodes and can be 
managed by a QKP. QKP will know the real-time remaining number of secret keys 
in the KS, which can decide when to connect the QKD link for secret key provision-
ing. Hence, efficient QKP construction is beneficial for efficiently employing QKD.
An example of QKP between Node-A and Node-B is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
QKD node is composed of several components based on the existing QKD technolo-
gies, e.g., QKD transceiver, trusted repeater, and switch [23]. The generated secret 
keys between QKD Node-A and QKD Node-B can be stored in KS-A and KS-B, 
which are embedded in Node-A and Node-B, respectively. Specifically, the gener-
ated secret keys are managed by QKPA–B to monitor the real-time remaining number 
of secret keys and provision secret keys between Node-A and Node-B.
3. QKD over SDON Architecture
An architecture of QKD over SDONs is illustrated in Figure 4(a), which consists 
of four layers from top to bottom: application (App) layer, control layer, QKD layer, 
Figure 2. 
An example of QKD distance extension based on a trusted repeater between the source and destination nodes.
Figure 3. 
An example of QKP for secret key provisioning between Node-A and Node-B.
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and optical layer. This architecture is different from the previous QKD-integrated 
optical networks [11] and decouples QKD layer from the optical layer via construct-
ing several QKPs in the QKD layer. Two types of QKPs are constructed to enhance 
the security of control signaling messages over the CChs, and confidential data 
services over the DChs, respectively. The QKP between the SDN controller and 
each node is called QKP-C (i.e., QKP-CCh), whereas the QKP between two nodes 
is called QKP-D (i.e., QKP-DCh). The SDN controller in the control layer controls 
and manages the QKD layer and optical layer via the southbound interface protocol 
(e.g., OpenFlow and NETCONF). Here we use OpenFlow protocol as an example. 
The SDN controller is capable of realizing flexible and programmable global opti-
cal network management, which can be utilized as the effective implementation 
technique for control layer. Moreover, it has been demonstrated in the recent study 
on time-shared QKD resources in SDN-controlled optical networks [28].
Optical layer and QKD layer can share the fiber bandwidth resources from exist-
ing WDM networks, in which at least two wavelengths need to be utilized as QCh 
and PCh to construct OpenFlow-enabled QKPs (OF-QKPs), and then the remaining 
wavelength resources can be utilized to transport confidential data services. The 
constructed OF-QKPs can provision secret keys to guarantee the security of CChs 
and DChs. In addition, OpenFlow-enabled optical cross connects (OF-OXCs) are 
placed in the optical layer. The SDN controller is capable of managing the entire 
network efficiently, whereas the OF-QKPs and OF-OXCs are capable of operating 
based on the instructions from SDN controller.
The App layer generates service requests with different security demands and 
interacts with control layer via the Restful API, in which Restful API is applied as 
northbound interface protocol. Based on the different security demands, CChs and 
DChs may require different number of secret keys. In particular, this QKD over 
SDON architecture can manage and control the network-wide secret key resources, 
which is beneficial to adapt diverse security demands and dynamic scenarios.
Figure 4(b) illustrates the configuration signaling procedure among the four 
layers in QKD over SDON architecture. This procedure can be described in the 
following five stages: (1) upon receiving a service request (e.g., the service request 
from Node 1 to Node 2) from the App, SDN controller first computes/selects 
path and then implements OpenFlow handshake with related OF-OXCs as well as 
OF-QKPs on the selected path; (2) after the establishment of first stage, OF-QKP-C1 
and OF-QKP-C2 are configured by the SDN controller to provision secret keys for 
Figure 4. 
(a) QKD over SDON architecture; and (b) the configuration signaling procedure.
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control/configuration messages over the CChs; (3) OF-QKP-D1–2 is configured by 
the SDN controller to provision secret keys for the service request from OF-OXC1 to 
OF-OXC2 over the DCh; (4) the SDN controller configures OF-OXC1 and OF-OXC2 
to encrypt data and transport the service; and (5) at last, SDN controller replies to 
the App.
4. Resource allocation in QKD over SDONs
4.1 Wavelength allocation
Since three types of channels (i.e., QChs, PChs, and DChs) are coexisting in a 
single fiber with WDM technique, wavelength allocation for these three types of 
channels becomes an essential issue. The total number of wavelengths for QChs, 
PChs, and DChs should conform to existing WDM networks, e.g., 40 wavelengths 
(with 100 GHz channel spacing) or 80 wavelengths (with 50 GHz channel spacing). 
Given the DCh is usually located at C-band (1530–1565 nm) in existing WDM net-
works, some previous studies have demonstrated QKD at O-band (1260–1360 nm) 
[29, 30] to achieve strong isolation from data transmission. Nevertheless, the faint 
quantum signals may suffer from more losses at O-band compared with C-band, 
which will limit the transmission distance and rate. Therefore, the three types of 
channels can be placed at C-band to achieve better quantum-signal transmission 
performance, as illustrated in Figure 5.
In particular, the physical layer impairments (e.g., Raman scattering and four-
wave-mixing effects) induced by PCh and DCh may have negative impacts on the 
QCh transmission performance. Raman scattering effects can be effectively reduced 
by placing the QCh at high frequency [31], thereby the wavelength reserved as 
QCh starts from 1530 nm. Besides, four-wave-mixing effects can be reduced by 
allocating 200 GHz guard band between QCh and other classical channels (i.e., 
PChs and DChs) [17]. Moreover, appropriate channel isolation and stable QKD 
operation can be achieved by using multistage band-stop filtering technique [32]. 
The PCh that transmits classical signals for key sifting and distillation as introduced 
in the principle of point-to-point QKD can share the same wavelengths with DCh 
or utilize the dedicated wavelengths at fiber C-band. The latter can be selected to 
ensure one-to-one relationship between the PCh and QCh, although the wavelength 
resources for data transmission may be degraded. This is because allocating dedi-
cated wavelengths for QCh and PCh is essential in a stable scenario. The intermedi-
ate nodes with trusted repeaters and erbium-doped fiber amplifiers (EDFAs) can 
be deployed for QCh and PCh/DCh, respectively, to extend quantum and classical 
signal transmission distance, in which EDFA bypass scheme [30, 33] can be utilized 
Figure 5. 
Wavelength allocation for the three types of channels (i.e., QChs, PChs, and DChs) over the C-band in a single 
fiber.
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for quantum and classical signal coexistence in a single fiber to suppress the noise 
from the EDFA’s amplified spontaneous emission (ASE).
4.2 Time-slot allocation
Given the finite wavelength resources in a single fiber and the high cost of estab-
lishing QChs and PChs, each wavelength for QCh/PCh is segmented into multiple 
time slots according to optical time division multiplexing (OTDM) technique [34]. 
Hence, each time slot can be utilized to establish a QCh/PCh for improving resource 
utilization. We assume that the secret keys provisioned for a service request with 
specific security demand are exchanged between the source and destination nodes 
within a fixed time t, thereby each QCh/PCh occupies a time slot. On the basis of 
the principle of point-to-point QKD described above, t consists of channel estima-
tion and calibration time, qubit exchange time, key sifting time, and key distillation 
time. In particular, the scattering and loss may impact the secret key rate between 
two nodes, which will lead to different number of secret keys shared between dif-
ferent node pairs within t in QKD over SDONs. In the network model, to fix t with 
a realistic and simplified manner, the size of t can be set as the secret key exchange 
time for a fixed key size (e.g., 128, 192, and 256 bit while using AES encryption 
algorithm [35]) under the worst scenario in QKD over SDONs.
Additionally, to prevent attacks for enhancing the data encryption security, the 
secret keys provisioned for each service request with specific security demand can 
be updated in a period T. The parameter, T, is the period after which the secret key 
must be changed between two nodes. The security level increases while decreasing 
the value of T. This is because the secret keys provisioned for a service request with 
specific security demand are updated more frequently, thereby increasing the diffi-
culty of cracking the encryption key by a third party [36]. Accordingly, considering 
the key-updating period, time-slot allocation for QCh/PCh becomes a new topic to 
be studied. Also, routing, wavelength, and time-slot allocation (RWTA) strategy for 
establishing the three types of channels (i.e., QChs, PChs, and DChs) needs to be 
considered.
For instance, Figure 6 illustrates two security level configuration solutions, 
in which the parameter, t, is the secret key exchange time between the source and 
destination nodes for each service request with specific security demand, and the 
parameter, T, is the key-updating period (t < T, which guarantees that the secret 
keys can be exchanged within a period). In solution 1, we fix T for all the QCh/PCh 
wavelengths and each service request with specific security demand has the same 
security level value of T. Note that the QCh/PCh wavelengths are the wavelengths 
in WDM optical networks that are reserved as QCh/PCh. The solution 1 can only 
provide one security level, which may limit the flexibility of security demands of 
service requests. However, service requests triggered from numerous security-hun-
gry applications may have different security demands with different security levels. 
Hence, each QCh wavelength has a flexible T values in solution 2, thereby different 
security levels can be provisioned. For different service requests with security 
demands, this solution can provision more security level types.
4.3 Secret key allocation
Data encryption algorithms need to be considered for CChs and DChs while 
performing secret key allocation. One-time pad (OTP) encryption algorithm was 
invented to achieve information-theoretic security, in which the secret key size 
should be as long as the data size [26]. Hence, OTP encryption algorithm requires 
much execution time/storage to perform data encryption, which is difficult to be 
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utilized for high-bit-rate data encryption in SDONs and has negative impacts on 
the efficiency of SDONs. Nevertheless, symmetric encryption algorithms [37] can 
be used to perform large amount of data encryption with small secret key size and 
fast execution time. A commonly used symmetric encryption algorithm is advanced 
encryption standard (AES) algorithm, which can be integrated with QKD to imple-
ment high-bit-rate data encryption [38, 39]. Using secret key lengths of 128, 192, 
and 256 bit, the AES algorithm can encrypt/decrypt large amount of data in blocks 
of 128 bit [35]. Hence, the secret key receiving module and data encryption module 
can be added in optical transport nodes to perform secret key communication and 
processing.
Nevertheless, the third party can eavesdrop a sequence of encrypted data to 
crack the secret keys while using AES algorithm. Then, two important factors, i.e., 
data size and data transmission time, need to be considered during a crack [40, 41]. 
In order to degrade the probability of encrypted data being cracked, the secret key 
can be frequently changed between two nodes based on the key-updating period. 
Key updating is essential to enhance the security of data encryption while using 
AES algorithm to secure CChs and DChs. Accordingly, the time complexity and data 
complexity of attacks can be considered for key updating in which time complexity 
is the maximum available time for a secret key and data complexity is the maximum 
encrypted data size by a secret key. The security level increases with the increase of 
secret key length or the decrease of secret key-updating period. Therefore, we can 
qualitatively evaluate the security level based on secret key length and updating 
period.
Given the secret key resources are limited and precious in QKPs, the secret key 
allocation issue for CChs and DChs needs to be solved. The control/configuration 
messages transmitted over the CChs in SDONs are usually at megabit-per-second 
transmission rate, which are low compared with the data complexity of attacks 
[40]. Accordingly, secret key allocation and updating are accomplished for each 
CCh in the SDON to enhance its security. Through the path of a data service, each 
node along the path will be configured by the SDN controller via the corresponding 
CCh. According to the specific security demand of each CCh, QKP-C allocates the 
required secret keys between SDN controller and each node to enhance the security 
Figure 6. 
Two security-level provisioning solutions: (a) solution 1: fixed T for all the QCh/PCh wavelengths; and 
(b) solution 2: flexible T for each QCh/PCh wavelength.
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of each CCh. Hence, we can allocate different number of secret keys to CChs 
between SDN controller and each node for encrypting/decrypting the control/con-
figuration messages. As illustrated with an example in Figure 7, Keyx–y denotes the 
required number of secret keys in which x and y represent the node serial number 
and service serial number, respectively. Key1–1/Key2–1 is allocated to CChs between 
the SDN controller and Node 1/Node 2 for Service 1, whereas Key1–2/Key2–2/Key3–2 
is allocated to CChs between the SDN controller and Node 1/Node 2/Node 3 for 
Service 2.
The required number of secret keys for each data service over the DChs is 
associated with the secret key length and updating period. The QKP-D can allocate 
the required number of secret keys to enhance the security of data services over 
the DChs in SDONs. As illustrated with an example in Figure 8, three data services 
(i.e., r1, r2, and r3) have different security demands. In Figure 8(a) and (b), we 
consider the time complexity of attacks (i.e., Ty) and data complexity (i.e., Dy) of 
attacks for secret key updating, respectively, in which the parameter, y, represents 
the data service serial number. Based on AES algorithm, the required secret key 
lengths of r1, r2, and r3 are 128, 192, and 256 bit, respectively. Additionally, as shown 
in Figure 8(a), the required secret key-updating periods of r1, r2, and r3 are T1, T2, 
and T3 (T1 < T2 < T3), respectively; whereas in Figure 8(b), the required secret 
key-updating periods of r1, r2, and r3 are D1, D2, and D3 (D1 < D2 < D3), respectively. 
Specifically, the data service with longer secret key length and shorter secret key-
updating period demands shows higher security level and will require more secret 
keys to be allocated for data encryption. Thus, routing, wavelength, and secret key 
allocation (RWKA) strategy for CChs and DChs in a timely manner on demand is 
necessary to be considered.
Figure 7. 
Secret key allocation and updating for CChs.
Figure 8. 
Secret key allocation and updating for services with different security requirements based on (a) case 1: time 
complexity of attacks and (b) case 2: data complexity of attacks.
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5. Open issues and challenges
5.1 Survivability for QKD over SDONs
QKD can provide secret keys for end-to-end paths and improve the security 
of SDONs. However, how to guarantee survivability in a QKD over SDON is an 
important topic. QCh and PCh should be protected simultaneously in a QKD over 
SDON. Especially due to the utilization of key-updating period (security level) 
with different time slots, protection action will occur at a subwavelength level. 
Synchronization might also be a difficult problem for QCh, PCh, and DCh.
5.2 Cost optimization for QKD over SDONs
In a QKD network, two types of nodes should be deployed, i.e., QKD node and 
intermediate node with trusted repeaters. Also, several wavelength channels in 
existing WDM optical networks should be planned as QChs and PChs. In practice, 
different number of nodes and QChs/PChs may produce different costs and perfor-
mance for QKD over SDONs. Accordingly, how to optimize the cost of deploying 
QKD over SDONs while satisfying the performance requirements is another open 
issue.
5.3 Key on demand (KoD) for QKD over SDONs
The secret key rate (i.e., the generation of secret keys in bits per second) in 
current advanced QKD systems is extremely low compared with the gigabit data 
transmission over each wavelength in WDM optical networks. Increasing the num-
ber of nodes and QChs/PChs can further increase the secret key rate, but it will also 
drastically increase the system complexity and power consumption. Thus, the use 
of an efficient key on demand (KoD) scheme to achieve efficient secret key resource 
usage while satisfying security requirements of CChs and DChs is also essential for 
QKD over SDONs.
6. Conclusions
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the basic principles and enabling 
technologies of QKD. Based on the QKD-enabling technologies, an architecture of 
QKD over SDONs is presented. Resource allocation problem is elaborated in detail 
and is classified into wavelength allocation, time-slot allocation, and secret key 
allocation problems in QKD over SDONs. Finally, several open issues and challenges 
are discussed.
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